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1. Introduction 
 A theoretical literature focused on fiscal federalism argues that intergovernmental transfers 
can be designed to increase efficiency and to redistribute resources equitably (Oates, 1999) but, in 
practice, critics argue that intergovernmental transfers are more likely to be designed to pursue 
political ambition (Ferejohn, 1974; Rogoff and Siebert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). A growing literature 
has identified the way that transfers have been designed to win votes (especially in developing 
countries). Politicians have designed transfers “….to enforce their electoral advantage” (Golden 
and Min, 2013:86). In this paper, the first objective is to question whether politicians in Mexico 
have designed intergovernmental transfers to win votes.  
 The question of whether politicians are likely to have engaged in ‘distributive politics’ in 
Mexico is important because: 
 
(i) Mexico relies more heavily on transfers than almost every other federation. In 2005, 
transfers were typically 23% of total government expenditure; higher than the average of 13% 
of total government expenditure for all OECD countries (Blöchliger and Vammalle, 2009). In 
the 1980’s, the National System of Fiscal Coordination (Sistema Nacional de Coordinación 
Fiscal) assigned authority to the federal government to raise value-added tax revenue, with the 
proviso that the federal government would distribute tax revenues to the 32 Mexican states. The 
states continued to surrender taxing powers to the federal government in the 1990s in exchange 
for greater access to intergovernmental transfers (Sobarzo Fimbres 2009). Between 2005 and 
2010 the Mexican states received more than 85% of their total revenue in the form of 
intergovernmental transfers and their own revenue was less than 7% of their total revenue 
(Abbott et al. 2015). 
  
(ii) An analysis of the disbursement of intergovernmental transfers in Mexico is also likely to 
offer insight into the relevance of changes in the intensity of electoral competition. Between 1929 
and 2000, Mexico was governed by the same political party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional) and there was very little competition. Every president, state governor, senator and 
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deputy were members of the PRI. In 1989, the first representative from a political party other than 
the PRI was elected governor (in the northern border state of Baja California). In the federal 
election of 1997 the PRI failed to win a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. It was only in 1998 
that the PRI lost their qualified majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time.1 Despite 
this the PRI maintains a large subnational state government presence (Timmons and Broid 2013). 
 
(iii) An analysis of the disbursement of intergovernmental transfers in Mexico is also likely to 
offer insight into the relevance of the constraints that have been introduced to reduce politicians’ 
reliance on ‘distributive politics’. The first of these constraints is reliance on pre-determined 
formulae when designing intergovernmental transfers. In Mexico, the Chamber of Deputies (the 
Lower Chamber) has exclusive authority to approve (or reject) budgets and, since 2000, Mexican 
states have lobbied the Lower Chamber (Olmeda 2009). As the Chamber now receives proposals 
based on pre-determined formulae, the expectation is that pre-determined formulae will reduce 
politicians’ discretion to rely on transfers to win votes.  
 A second constraint in Mexico is that incumbent politicians are not able to stand for immediate 
re-election to local, or to national, office. This constitutional constraint is designed to reduce the 
likelihood that politicians will focus on the self-serving strategy of approving transfers to 
maximise their personal popularity in their own constituencies.2 The expectation is that this 
constraint will reduce politicians’ incentive to design intergovernmental transfers to win votes.  
 
 The second objective in this paper is to explore, more generally, incumbents’ incentive to 
design intergovernmental transfers to win votes. When are they more likely to design 
intergovernmental transfers to reward core supporters and when are they more likely to design 
intergovernmental transfers to win votes? The final objective is to focus on their discretion to rely 
on intergovernmental transfers. Are constitutional constraints (such as predetermined formulae for 
                                                          
1 This happened after the election of July 1997 (Montero 2001). 
2 Commenting on the likelihood that political representatives might focus on political popularity rather than 
‘national interest’, Epstein (2010: 851) argues that in a federation: “The territorial nature of our political 
system directs elected officials to look locally even though their public duties extend nationally”. 
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intergovernmental transfers) likely to eliminate incumbents’ discretion to design intergovernmental 
transfers to pursue electoral ambitions? 
 In the next section of the paper attention focuses on politicians’ strategies to win political 
popularity. Section three describes the institutional background in which politicians allocate 
intergovernmental transfers. Section four of the paper describes the data and the model employed to 
test predictions formed in section two. The final section of the paper considers conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
 
2. Intergovernmental Transfers and Electoral Ambition 
 It is possible to draw on a well-established literature on ‘distributive politics’ to consider the 
alternative strategies that politicians might call on to win electoral support. When Golden and Min 
(2013) surveyed this literature they referred to the first strategy as one of favouritism. Incumbents 
disburse transfers to favour political (or ethnic) groups. Politicians are able to reward their core 
supporters with the rents they are able to disburse while they are in office. 
 The second strategy focuses on competition for votes. In this literature, studies often call on 
Dixit and Londregan’s (1996) model, which suggests that politicians disburse transfers to groups of 
voters within a single constituency. While voters are assumed to have exogenous and fixed 
ideologies, some will support a political party further from their partisan reference point if that party 
offers a transfer that is large enough to outweigh their ideological attachment. Voters with strong 
partisan attachments require larger transfers than ‘moderates’. Politicians usually compete for 
moderates (or ‘swing voters’). It is impossible to ignore the likelihood that risk-averse politicians 
might target core supporters if they feel they have a substantial informational advantage about the 
nature of the transfers that will win support from core supporters (also see Cox and McCubbins, 
1986). But Golden and Min (2013:79) argue that the “…results in (this) line of research are usually 
interpreted as favouring the swing-voters hypothesis”.3 
                                                          
3 In some instances, incumbents reward core supporters in jurisdictions with the highest proportion of votes 
for incumbents (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Hanes, 2007). However, in many other studies politicians 
design transfers to win ‘swing states’ (Case, 2001; Johansson, 2003; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). 
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 When exploring politicians’ incentive to win votes, Golden and Min (2013) also consider a 
literature that focuses on the timing of distributive politics (e.g. Shy and Svensoon 2006; Cole 2009). 
In this literature the question is “… whether politicians seeming to improve their chances of winning 
a forthcoming election deliberately allocate goods and services just prior to an election” (Golden and 
Min, 2013: 83). 
When predicting politicians’ behaviour in Mexico it is important to recognise the emergence 
and growth of electoral competition. In this paper, the hypothesis is that incumbents’ strategies 
depend on their perception of the likelihood that they will be returned to office (see Frey and 
Schneider, 1978a; 1978b). The greater their perception of the intensity of electoral competition, the 
greater the likelihood that they will rely on a ‘political business cycle’ (Nordhaus 1975). The greater 
their perception of the intensity of electoral competition, the greater the incentive to consider the 
timing of elections and the importance of winning swing states.  
In this paper, the objective is to focus on the design of intergovernmental transfers approved 
by the Chamber of Deputies between 2004 and 2012. Prior to 1998, the PRI was in full control of 
the Presidency and the Lower Chamber. The Lower Chamber had no real role to play. Budgets 
proposed by the President (via the Treasury) were approved without modification. When Kraemer 
(1997: 36) questioned the way that incumbents in Mexico pursued political ambition in this period, 
he reported that between 1986 and 1992 “…states loyal to the PRI receive(d), ceteris paribus, more 
per capita funds than the opposition strongholds”. The strategy was one of favouritism (to reward 
core supporters). With political competition and with an increase in the diversity of representation 
in the Lower Chamber, the Lower Chamber would now play a more effective role and representatives 
had an incentive to design intergovernmental transfers to win ‘swing states’. A ‘swing state’ is 
defined with reference to the difference between electoral support for the incumbent political party 
and electoral support for the next most successful political party.4 
                                                          
4 While many studies support the prediction in Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1987) that politicians focus on ‘swing voters’, the tests focus on ‘swing states’, rather than on the individual 
voters within a constituency (e.g. Case 2001; Johansson 2003). Some have relied on survey data to estimate 
the distribution of ideological preferences in each constituency (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002) but analysis 
is still at the constituency level (Golden and Min 2013). 
. 
5 
 
Focusing on (i) intergovernmental transfers to Mexican states (approved by the Lower 
Chamber) and (ii) elections of representatives to the Lower Chamber, the first three testable 
predictions are: 
(i) In Mexico, politicians in the Chamber of Deputies are likely to have designed 
intergovernmental transfers to win votes. 
(ii) Intergovernmental transfers are likely to have been higher in election years. 
(iii) Intergovernmental transfers are likely to have favoured ‘swing states’.  
 
When exploring the relevance of ‘swing states’, it is important to question whether 
incumbent governments might also have rewarded core supporters. Banful (2011) reported that 
intergovernmental transfers were disbursed to ‘swing states’ in Ghana and he also ran a test to 
check whether there was also evidence that politicians “…target more resources on areas in which 
their political support is concentrated” (p. 382). To support (and emphasise) the proposition that 
politicians have focused on ‘swing states’ in Mexico, the final prediction is that: 
 
(iv) Intergovernmental transfers are not likely to have simply favoured jurisdictions with 
the highest support for the incumbent party. 
 
 
3. Institutional Background 
 In this section of the paper the objective is to describe (i) the influence that the Lower Chamber 
is now able to exert and (ii) the intergovernmental transfers that the Lower Chamber has approved. 
 
(i) Mexico has a presidential system, consisting of three levels of government: the federal union; 
the state governments (31 independent states and one federal district); and 2,457 municipalities. The 
federal government has three branches: executive, legislative and judicial. The executive consists of 
the President and Cabinet of Ministers, while the legislature has a Congress of the Union, consisting 
of a Senate (Upper Chamber) and a Chamber of Deputies (Lower Chamber). Within the Mexican 
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Constitution (Article 74), the Executive presents the federal budget (including the allocation of 
transfers), via the Secretaría de Hacienda (Treasury Ministry), to the Chamber of Deputies for 
approval. The Chamber of Deputies has 500 elected representatives. Each representative serves for 
a term of three years (with no possibility of immediate re-election) and the dates of the election are 
fixed. Three hundred of the 500 deputies are elected to single seats in a ‘first past the post’ voting 
system. The remainder are distributed through proportional representation. During the 1980s Mexico 
undertook fiscal reforms (see Rodriguez 1997; Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Timmons and Broid 2013) 
whereby the states surrendered the majority of its revenue raising powers to the federal government, 
in return for a guaranteed share of revenue in the form of federal transfers. As such, these transfers 
are the states own revenue by law. 
 Control of the Chamber of Deputies is very important. Gutiérrez et al. (2001) note that in many 
other federations this process would also require approval by a second chamber. Before 1998, 
discretion over revenue-sharing rested with the President and with the chief economic ministries 
(Montero, 2001). Today, the Chamber of Deputies is able to adjust the budget presented by the 
Executive. 
 When considering the discretion that the Chamber of Deputies has exercised, attention focuses 
on the extent to which it has approved transfers that differed from formulae-driven proposals. Sour 
et al. (2004) offer insight into the influence that the Chamber exerted when it approved budgets 
during the LVII (1998-2000) and LVIII (2001-2003) legislatures. They compared the Executive’s 
proposals and the budgets that the Chamber approved. Table 1 is based on their analysis. There are 
differences between proposals and approvals (for conditional and for unconditional transfers) 
between 2001 and 2003. The differences are more significant in 2002 (the year before the federal 
election for the Chamber of Deputies). 
< TABLE 1 NEAR HERE > 
  The Chamber has exercised discretion by approving transfers that differ from proposals 
based on pre-determined formulae (rather than by changing pre-determine formulae). With this 
awareness of the Chamber’s discretion, a recent study of fiscal federal relations in Mexico refers to 
the ‘ease’ with which states “…lobby for higher federal transfers” (Caldera Sánchez 2013:17). 
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Federal governments don’t enforce a hard budget on the states and extraordinary transfers still exist 
despite fiscal reforms. 
Langston (2010) documents in detail the way state governors use their state deputies to 
influence and to benefit from increased federal transfers in the annual budgeting process and to 
bargain over fiscal bills. Influence is exerted in exchange for (i) political nominations and future 
political posts (in the context of non-consecutive re-election) and (ii) money and staff for political 
campaigns. He describes how the final negotiation over the annual spending bill is defined by the 
Budget Committee Chamber (Comisión de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública) and how specific 
spending requests are received from state deputies (to be financed by additional federal transfers 
made available during the annual budget negotiations within the Chamber). “Supposedly, the 
distribution of … two transfers (participaciones and aportaciones) is controlled by a government 
formula, but in practice, individual accounts rise and fall over time in ways that cannot be explained 
by the formula” (Langston 2010: 264).  
Timmons and Broid (2013) also note that Mexican states can exercise discretion in the 
allocation of transfers from the states to municipalities. This is either done explicitly or through 
changes to the allocation formula used for municipal transfers. Their further analysis suggests a 
partisan bias in transfers to municipalities governed by the PRI, but through formula allocation 
changes and through the short-term actions of governors e.g. where legislation is passed with weak 
scrutiny.  
In this paper, attention will focus on transfers from the federal government to the Mexican 
states in the knowledge that transfers approved by the Chamber of Deputies have differed from 
proposals based on pre-determined formulae. Have political representatives in the Chamber 
exercised this discretion systematically? Have they exercised discretion in pursuit of political 
ambition? 
  
(ii) Intergovernmental transfers to Mexican states are 43.4% of Mexico’s total tax revenue, 
compared to an average of 10.4% for 8 other OECD economies (Bergvall et al. 2006). The corollary 
of this is that sub-central government ‘own revenue’ is a very small percentage of total revenue. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the growth of transfers and own state income in Mexico between 1990 and 2014. 
The proportion of total revenue raised by the states has fallen from 10.5% of total revenue in 1990 
to 8.4% in 2014. Intergovernmental transfers have increased from 61% of total average states’ 
revenue in 1990 to 85% in 2014. 
< FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE > 
 The geographic distribution of mean transfers per capita (for the period 2004 to 2012) is 
illustrated in Table 2. Across the 31 states, on average, transfers amount to 9,432 Mexican Pesos per 
capita but the standard deviation is significant at 2,495 Pesos per capita. Richer states in the north 
contributed the largest shares of tax revenues to the federal government, but they received less (in 
per capita terms) than states in the south. 
< TABLE 2 NEAR HERE > 
 It is important to note the distinction between two forms of intergovernmental transfers: 
discretionary (unconditional) transfers (Participaciones) and non-discretionary (conditional) 
transfers (Aportaciones). The Participaciones are discretionary (unconditional) in the sense that 
governments in local jurisdictions are able to choose how to spend the transfers. Each form 
comprises eight funds: 
  
(i)  Participaciones: This system was established in 1980 (following the National System of 
Fiscal Consolidation) when the states agreed to restrain their own revenue raising authority. The 
Fondo General de Participaciones accounted for 86% of these transfers in 2010 (Caldera Sanchez 
2013). The pre-determined formulae between 1991 and 2007 was: (i) 45.17% of transfers 
allocated proportionally to the population; (ii) 45.17% allocated with reference to the collection 
of three federal taxes levied by the states5; (iii) 9.66% allocated on a compensation basis (in 
inverse proportion to the number of people in each state). In 2007 the formulae changed and, 
from 2008, it was based on: (i) GDP growth weighted by population (60%); (ii) the level of own-
income weighted by population (10%); (iii) own-income growth weighted by population (30%). 
                                                          
5 Specifically for the collection of road tax, new vehicles tax and special taxes over products and services 
(e.g. alcohol and tobacco taxes). 
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 Twenty per cent of finance for the Fondo General is provided by revenue from the 
Recaudación Federal Participable (RFP). The RFP comprises all tax revenue collected by the 
federal government, plus revenue from oil and mining rights but with the exception of (i) revenue 
levied on the road tax, the new vehicles tax and the special taxes on products and services, (ii) 
tax refunds and (iii) other minor exclusions. The other seven funds of Participaciones are mainly 
financed from the RFP; from oil royalties and from special taxes on alcohol and tobacco. The 
formulae for all eight funds is summarized in Table 1A of the Appendix. 
 
(ii)  Aportaciones: This system of non-discretionary transfers was introduced in 1997 with the 
consolidation of several categories of spending.6 The transfers are distributed through eight 
different funds. The four largest funds in 2010 were for (i) education (59%), health (12%), social 
infrastructure (9%) and municipal development (9%) (Caldera Sanchez 2013). Earmarked 
transfers for education and for health (to pay teachers’ and doctors’ salaries) form the bulk of 
Aportaciones (Ahmed et al., 2007). Each fund has its own predetermined formulae, e.g.: 
(a) education funds depend largely on school enrolment; 
(b) health funds depend largely on inventories of medical infrastructure; 
(c) social infrastructure funds (financed through the RFP) depend largely on estimates of 
poverty; per capita income; sewage and water service availability. 
The formulae used for the allocation of the eight funds of the Aportaciones is summarized in Table 
2A of the Appendix. 7 
 The distinction between conditional and unconditional grants will become important later in 
the paper when reflecting on strategies to disburse transfers to win votes. One of the advantages of 
disbursement to core supporters is that incumbents have greater knowledge of core supporters’ 
preferences (Box and McCubbins 1986). However, if local politicians of the same party as the 
incumbent at federal government are prepared to credit the federal-government incumbent when they 
                                                          
6 More precisely, the categories consolidated under Aportaciones were those related to expenditure on health 
(Ramo 12), education (Ramo 25) and regional development (Ramo 26).  
7 For more details on the sources of funding for Participaciones and Aportaciones see Caldera Sanchez 
(2013). 
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receive transfers, an increase in unconditional transfers (that can be spent at the discretion of the 
recipient) might also be effective when competing for votes. Oates (1972) emphasised the 
importance of local governments’ greater knowledge of local preferences to ensure that expenditures 
match the preferences of the median voter in the local jurisdiction. Here the intention is to consider 
the politics of disbursement of aggregate transfers and the disbursement of the unconditional 
(discretionary) Participaciones, because this greater knowledge of supportive local politicians might 
ensure that unconditional disbursements will be even more effective in terms of winning votes.  
  Throughout the empirical sections of the paper the question is whether the differences 
between formulae-driven proposals received by the Chamber and transfers approved by the Chamber 
reflected the pursuit of political ambition. Have politicians focused systematically on the timing of 
elections and on the importance of winning ‘swing states’? 
 
4. Testing Predictions  
The Data and the Model  
The empirical analysis was undertaken with data from 2003 to 2012 for all the Mexican 
states except Distrito Federal. Distrito Federal is the capital of the country and is administered 
differently. For instance, unlike other states, Distrito Federal does not receive conditional transfers 
to pay teachers’ payroll (the federal government finances this expenditure in the Mexican capital).8  
The states’ own revenue data, as well as data for both Participaciones (discretionary 
transfers) and Aportaciones (non-discretionary transfers), were taken from Estadísticas de las 
Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales, which is compiled by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), Mexico's National Institute of Statistics. GDP per capita ﬁgures 
and unemployment series were drawn from INEGI's Economic Information Database. All of the 
data is presented in real pesos of 2003. 
                                                          
8 Also, until 2014 Distrito Federal was not able to receive resources from the Fund for Social Infrastructure 
(the FAIS). 
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A dependency ratio was calculated as the ratio of citizens under the age of 15 and over the 
age of 64 to productive citizens (aged between 15 and 64) in each state. This ratio is important 
because provision of conditional transfers for programmes, such as education and health care, 
might be influenced by this ratio. The data were taken from Consejo Nacional de Población. Vote 
shares and vote margins were calculated with data from the Instituto Nacional Electoral (formerly 
known as Instituto Federal Electoral). 
The sample period begins in 2003 because the paper focuses on states’ real GDP per capita 
(compiled using constant 2003 prices). Before 2003 the available data (published from 1993 to 
2006) was only available in constant 1993 prices. With a change in the base year, there was also a 
change in the methodology that was used to calculate prices, and it is not possible to obtain a 
consistent series. The estimation period loses one observation because we use a one-period lag 
structure (and, therefore, the main focus is on the period from 2004 to 2012). 
Summary statistics of the variables used for estimation are presented in Table 3. 
< TABLE 3 NEAR HERE > 
Turning to the first set of predictions:  
 
(i) In Mexico, politicians in the Chamber of Deputies are likely to have designed 
intergovernmental transfers to win votes. 
(ii) Intergovernmental transfers are likely to have been higher in election years. 
(iii) Intergovernmental transfers are likely to have favoured ‘swing states’.  
 
The determinants of intergovernmental per capita transfers for state i at time period t (trit) 
can be estimated through: 
itti1it7t6lt5lit4lit31it21it1it inargmelecrevdrunytrtr ελυδδδδδδδ +++++++++= −−−−−−   (1) 
The variables trit and yit-1 are expressed in natural logarithms. A one-period lag structure for 
the independent variables is used to account for administrative delays in the reaction of per capita 
transfer allocations, or delays due to federal budgetary processes. Lagged transfers capture also the 
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persistence or inertia in the evolution of transfers. Indeed, the use of predetermined formulae in the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers makes both conditional and unconditional transfers more 
persistent. 
In order to test the proposition that politicians in Mexico have designed intergovernmental 
transfers to win votes, it is also necessary to consider the relevance of the many other variables that 
might have acted as determinants of intergovernmental transfers. With evidence (Wildavsky 1988) 
that budgetary transfers in the current year are likely to depend on transfers that adjust for errors in 
the past, trit-1 was included in equation (1), with the expectation that δ1>0. As the institutional 
arrangement in Mexico is that the federal government acts as an agent, collecting tax revenues on 
behalf of local jurisdictions, it is also important to consider GDP per capita. To account for the 
reimbursement principle (principio resarcitorio), whereby richer states receive larger transfers 
(reflecting their higher contributions to federal tax revenues), y (the log level of real state GDP per 
capita) is included in equation (1) and the expectation is that δ2>0. 
As federal governments might have disbursed higher transfers to states with higher 
unemployment rates (un) and to states with a higher dependency ratio (dr), these control variables 
are also included in equation (1), with the expectation that δ3>0 and δ4 >0. The equation also 
includes the ratio of own revenue to total revenue (rev) and here the expectation is that δ5<0.  
With the likelihood that intergovernmental transfers may have been designed to win votes, 
transfers are likely to have been higher in election years (elect). This study focuses on the fixed 
term elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Transfers are also likely to have depended on the 
difference in the vote-share for the incumbent party and for its nearest rival (margin) in each 
Mexican state. The smaller the difference in the vote margin between the two parties, the larger the 
expected transfers (so δ7 <0). Panel-level effects are represented by  and idiosyncratic time 
effects by . All reported estimated standard errors are clustered at the state level, so allowing for 
heteroscedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation between observations within each state. 
 
The Results 
iυ
tλ
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Our chosen econometric specification includes the lagged level of transfers distributed to the states. 
This is important, since it enables us to differentiate between the short run and long run effects of 
our determinants (Jennes and Persyn 2015). Moreover, the allocation of transfers might be slow to 
adjust over time and conditional on past amounts, particularly in the Mexican case where allocation 
formulas are deemed particularly important to what states are expected to receive. 
A problem that emerges when one tries to estimate the model in (1) using standard OLS 
methods is that, by including the lagged value of transfers on the right-hand side as a regressor, there 
is a bias caused by the correlation between this lagged variable and the error term. Controlling for a 
potential lagged transfers effect is very important in the context of Mexican transfers, since the 
formulaic allocation of transfers implies persistence should be expected and lobbying gives the 
potential to ensure a similar transfer allocation to the year before. To avoid such bias, we follow the 
example of Veiga and Veiga (2013) and Huang and Cheng (2012), who also employ the System 
Generalized Method of the Moments (SYS-GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) 
in modelling fiscal transfers in Portugal and China, respectively. Under SYS-GMM lags and lagged 
differences are employed to instrument for any endogenous variable. Relative to ordinary fixed 
effects models, SYS-GMM has the advantage of allowing the consistent estimation of endogenous 
right-hand-sideariables, such as the lag of the dependent variable in equation (1), which account for 
persistence in the allocation of transfers. By construction, the choice of the appropriate number of 
lags (levels and differences) provides estimators free from endogeneity problems, as long as lags and 
lagged differences are uncorrelated with the error term in (1). Moreover, SYS-GMM estimators are 
said to be consistent if there is no second order serial correlation in the residuals according to the 
Arellano-Bond test and if the instruments employed are valid according to the Hansen test. Both 
tests are reported along the main estimates. We also report the difference-in-Hansen test for the 
exogeneity of instruments subset. Under the null hypothesis, the instruments subset is uncorrelated 
with the error term. Along with the previous two tests, this test needs to be satisfied to validate our 
SYS-GMM estimators. 
The results from the SYS-GMM estimation of (1) are reported in Table 4. Persistence in the 
allocation of transfers (the impact of the previous year’s transfers) is significant for both 
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unconditional and conditional transfers. As might be expected, the allocation of transfers has a high 
degree of persistence, with monies distributed today being largely driven by allocations in the past 
year. The economic size of the state, as reflected in the state’s GDP per capita, has a statistically 
significant and positive effect on both unconditional and conditional transfers. The coefficients are 
small in magnitude, implying that transfers are income inelastic, also the marginal effect is slightly 
stronger for unconditional transfers, which might be expected given the reimbursement principle 
(principio resarcitorio). Unemployment has no influence on transfers. This might be due to the fact 
that Mexico does not provide unemployment welfare benefits to its population. However, the 
dependency ratio drit-1 is statistically significant for overall transfers and for conditional transfers. 
This result might, in part, be explained by the importance of the poverty alleviation programmes 
that exist in Mexico (quantified as part of conditional transfers). The elasticity of 1.67 implies a 1% 
rise in the dependency ratio raises conditional transfers by 1.67%. The lagged value of the own to 
total revenue ratio (rev) is not statistically significant, implying the allocation of transfers is not 
sensitive to the extent to which states generate revenue from within their own borders. 
< TABLE 4 NEAR HERE > 
While the pattern of transfers across states is not sensitive to the state governments’ ability 
to raise local government finance, total transfers are likely to be sensitive to the size of the federal 
government’s revenue. Figure 2 shows a positive correlation between Mexico’s federal revenue per 
capita and transfers per capita over the sample period. In Mexico, federal government revenues are 
likely to be sensitive to fluctuations in oil prices (as Mexico is a net exporter of crude oil and the 
government owns a significant proportion of the oil extraction rights). 
< FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE > 
Returning to Table 4, the political influence on the pattern of transfers is captured in the 
statistically significant influence of elect, where transfers are higher during election years. It is also 
the case that marginit-1 (the difference in vote shares between the incumbent and the nearest rival) is 
statistically significant for total transfers and for conditional transfers separately. The percentage 
gain for conditional transfers comes from e0.142-1=0.15, implying on average a 15% increase in 
conditional transfers during election years. Similarly, the gain in unconditional transfers is 10.7%. 
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These results indicate that transfers are higher in election years and that politicians focus on ‘swing 
states’. These results are consistent with Hernández-Trillos and Jarrillo-Rabling’s (2008) evidence 
that conditional transfers for social infrastructure favour localities with higher ‘swing voters’. They 
are also consistent with evidence that incumbents focus on ‘swing states’ in other developing 
countries (e.g. Banful, 2011).9 
While intergovernmental transfers are likely to increase the popularity of the party in office 
in the local jurisdiction (Mueller 2003), incumbents at federal government also have an incentive 
to favour a ‘swing state’ controlled (with a narrow margin) by a competing party, as long as they 
believe that they can persuade local voters of the benevolence of the incumbent party at federal 
government. In Mexico, it was also the case that local jurisdictions with narrow majorities were 
likely to be favoured (irrespective of the party in office in local government) because no single 
party held a majority in the Chamber of Deputies between 2004 and 2012. The incumbent at 
federal government was not able to design intergovernmental transfers just to advantage its own 
representatives. Decisions at the Chamber of Deputies were the outcomes of logrolling processes. 
Deputies from each political party attached priority to quid pro quo arrangements that 
favoured jurisdictions in which their party held a narrow majority, in return for the support they 
might provide for increased transfers to jurisdictions in which a competing political party held a 
narrow majority. 
Turning to the final question of whether there is any support for the proposition that the 
Chamber of Deputies also rewarded core supporters, consider the final prediction:  
 
(iv) Intergovernmental transfers are not likely to have simply favoured jurisdictions 
with the highest support for the incumbent party. 
 
                                                          
9 Federal governments might also be sensitive to distributing transfers to particular “battleground states”, 
where the margin of victory is very small. We therefore also test for the statistical significance of a variable 
that measures the difference between the vote share of the controlling party and 50%. However, hypothesis 
testing suggests the variable is not statistically significant. 
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 Following a received procedure (Banful 2011), attention now focuses on a different 
equation. In equation 2 the proxy for ‘swing states’ (marginit-1) has been replaced by voteit-1 (the 
share of votes in each Mexican state for the incumbent party in the Lower Chamber in the last 
election): 
 
itti1it7t6lt5lit4lit31it21it1it voteelecrevdrunytrtr ελυδδδδδδδ +++++++++= −−−−−−         (2) 
 
The hypothesis is that transfers will be greater to the states that offer the incumbent party the 
greatest support. In Table 5, the evidence is that intergovernmental transfers are higher for the 
states that offer lower electoral support to the incumbent political party in the Lower Chamber (as 
measured by voteit-1).  
< TABLE 5 NEAR HERE > 
This result is curious. As it implies that the most disloyal of states will receive the highest 
reward (ceteris paribus), there is no obvious incentive to signal this if the incumbents’ intention is 
to win more votes in the next election. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2012) present a persuasive critique of 
the proposition that core voters can always be relied on to support an incumbent. They argue that 
“…voters become loyal to the party not only because they receive material benefits today, but 
because they expect to continue to receive benefits in the future” (p. 24). It is difficult to rationalise 
systematic delivery of the highest reward to the least supportive voters. Diaz-Cayeros et al. 
acknowledge that there might often be incentives to offer rewards to swing voters because “… the 
temptation to buy swing voters on spot necessarily increases in highly competitive elections,” 
(p.117). However, at best, the negative coefficient on voteit-1 is spurious. 
Banful (2011) reported exactly the same result when he applied the same test for 
disbursements in Ghana. He reported that “…the measure of political support for the ruling 
party…is statistically significant but has the opposite sign that is predicted by the ‘core-supporter’ 
model…” (p.186). As there are difficulties in including both marginit-1 and voteit-1 in the same 
equation (difficulties created by collinearity), we follow Banful’s (2011) example; questioning the 
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negative coefficient in equation 2 and attaching greater weight to the positive coefficient on 
marginit-1 in equation 1. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The first conclusion in this paper is that the results in this paper are consistent with the 
prediction that incumbents in Mexico have designed intergovernmental transfers to win votes. 
After allowing for the impact of other determinants of intergovernmental transfers, the results 
indicate that transfers increased in election years and that transfers favoured voters in ‘swing 
states’. 
When focusing on other determinants of intergovernmental transfers, transfers in the current 
year have also depended on transfers received in the past, with an adjustment for errors (Wildavsky 
1988). Transfers have depended on GDP per capita (because the federal government assumed the 
role of raising tax and returning tax revenues to the citizens in the jurisdictions that pay tax) and 
they have also been higher for states with higher dependency ratios. However, the results are also 
consistent with the criticism that the timing and the pattern of intergovernmental transfers reflects 
politicians’ pursuit of political ambition.  
The second conclusion is that results in this paper contribute to the literature that focuses on 
incumbents’ strategies. Some studies provide evidence that governments disburse transfers to core 
supporters (e.g. Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr 2006; Larcinese at al. 2106; Solé-Ollé et al. 2008; 
Berry et al. 2010; Bracco et al. 2015). Others report evidence that incumbents disburse transfers to 
voters in swing-states (e.g. Case 2001; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Arulampalam et al. 2009; 
Banful 2011). This paper adds to this literature by providing evidence that, in Mexico, between 
2004 and 2012, incumbents were more likely to increase transfers to voters in swing states.  
This paper also contributes to the literature by offering insight into the determinants of 
incumbents’ choice of strategy. The comparison of strategies in Mexico (1986 to 1992 and 2004 to 
2012) highlights the relevance of electoral competition. When Kraemer focused on transfers 
between 1986 and 1992, he concluded that incumbents relied on transfers to reward core 
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supporters. By 2004 -2012 incumbents were relying on transfers to voters in swing states. With 
reference to the experience in Mexico (discussed in this paper), there are two reasons for expecting 
that an increase in electoral competition increases reliance on transfers to swing voters:  
(i) Electoral competition is likely to change the composition of the assembly that 
disburses transfers and this increase in diversity reduces the efficacy of transfers to 
core supporters. The strategy of relying on transfers to core supporter is attractive 
when there is a clear alignment between the party incumbent in federal government 
(e.g. the President) and the party incumbent in the local jurisdiction (e.g. the state 
governor, or state legislator). If electoral competition increases the proportion of 
opposition parties represented at the assembly that disburses transfers, transfers are 
more likely to depend on ‘pork barrel’ deals. Electoral competition is likely to increase 
transfers to states that have not supported the incumbent (‘governing’) party. This 
weakens the alignment between: (a) the coincidence between a governing party at a 
federal level and an incumbent party at a state level and (b) receipt of transfers. 
Between 2004 and 2012 there was no evidence that this coincidence determined 
intergovernmental transfers in Mexico. 10 
(ii) Electoral competition sharpens the trade-off between reliance on a strategy that 
increases the long-run loyalty of core voters and a strategy that responds to the 
immediacy of winning the support of the median voters. Frey and Schneider (1978a; 
1978b) demonstrate that, governments’ inclination to deliver rents to core supporters, 
increases as the size of the electoral majority increases. When electoral margins are 
likely to be narrow, it is preferable to rely on disbursements to voters in ‘swing states’, 
                                                          
10 Studies have reported the relevance of a co-incidence of the same governing political party at higher and 
lower levels of government when explaining the disbursement of transfers (e.g. Calvo and Murrilo 2004; 
Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008; Migueis 2013; Abbott et al. 2015). In our research (focusing on 
disbursements from the Lower Chamber between 2004 and 2012) this co-incidence was not a significant 
determinant of intergovernmental transfers (the evidence is available from the authors on request).With 
evidence of the relevance of ‘pork barrel’ deals in the Chamber of Deputies, a clear relationship between 
co-incidence between the governing parties at federal and local jurisdictions was likely to be affected by the 
influence of opposition-party representatives in the Chamber and their agenda to favour their jurisdiction-
constituencies. However, the evidence reported in this paper is consistent with the proposition that 
representatives of all parties in the Chamber attached greater importance to disbursement to voters in ‘swing 
states’. 
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where “..moderate voters who are indifferent between two parties can more easily be 
bought…” (Larcinese et al. 2006). In this paper, evidence is consistent with the 
proposition that incumbents at federal government have focused on electoral 
competition. The evidence is that both conditional and unconditional transfers 
increased in election years. It is also the case that representatives at federal government 
have increased conditional transfers by a greater extent to the states that are likely to 
deliver the narrowest electoral margin. The more that conditional transfers are 
associated with intervention by federal governments (to finance specific programmes), 
the greater the impact that an increase in conditional transfers is likely to exert in 
elections for representatives to the Chamber of Deputies. 
The third conclusion in this paper is that it is not necessarily the case that reliance on 
pre-determined formulae for intergovernmental transfers, and reliance on a constitutional 
constraint on re-election to office, will eliminate the likelihood that politicians’ will design 
intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. As in Ghana (Banful 2011) and in 
Portugal (Veiga and Pinho 2007), pre-determined formulae in Mexico failed to eliminate 
politicians’ discretion to design transfers to pursue political ambition.  
 The experience in Mexico, of reliance on a constitutional constraint (designed to ensure that 
politicians are not able to seek immediate re-election), offers more general insight into the likelihood 
that this constitutional constraint might eliminate politicians’ pursuit of self-serving strategies. When 
predicting the extent to which constitutional constraints are likely to be successful, it is important to 
consider the way that politicians are likely to respond, collectively, to the constraint that has been 
introduced. The experience in Mexico is that, as politicians cannot stand for immediate re-election 
in their own constituencies, they must find future employment after their term of office and their 
prospects often depend on the influence that their political party is able to exert on their behalf (to 
find employment within their party’s administration; within the government bureaucracy, or within 
lobby-group organisations). Also, as incumbents are able to become candidates after spending one 
term out of office, the fortunes of their party are also relevant when a politician intends to seek 
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political office as a representative of a different constituency.11 Far from distancing politicians from 
the pursuit of political ambition, the constraint has heightened the importance of the electoral success 
of the incumbents’ political party. As Moreno (2005:3) has observed: “In the Mexican case, where 
re-election of public office is constitutionally forbidden, the problem of political survival consists of 
assuring the victory of the incumbent’s party in the next electoral contest”.  
 Politicians are likely to have a greater incentive to design intergovernmental transfers to win 
votes (rather than reward core supporters) when electoral competition increases, and pre-determined 
formulae and re-election constraints are unlikely to eliminate incumbents’ discretion to rely on 
transfers to win votes. 
 
                                                          
11 Based on the biographies provided on the Cámara de Diputados website (www.diputados.gob.mx) about 
each legislature member, 39% of the deputies (194 out of 500) were at some point members of their 
respective local state legislature, 72% of them within the last 6 years. Additionally, 34 of the 500 were 
Senators, while 84 have been members of the Lower Chamber at least twice. 
21 
 
References 
Abbott, A., R. Cabral, P. Jones, and R. Palacios. 2015. Political pressure and procyclical 
expenditure: an analysis of the expenditures of state governments in Mexico. European 
Journal of Political Economy 37(1): 195-206. 
Ahmed, E., J. Gonzalez, A. G. Brosio, M. Gracia-Escribano, B. Lockwood, and E. Revilla. 2007. 
Why focus on spending need factors? The political economy of fiscal transfer reforms in 
Mexico. IMF Working Paper WP/07/252. 
Ansolabehere, S., and J. M. Snyder. 2006. Party control of state government and distribution of 
public expenditure. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108(4): 547-569. 
Arulampalam, W., S. Dasgupta, A. Dhillon, and B. Dutta. 2009. Electoral goals and center-state 
transfers: a theoretical model and empirical evidence from India. Journal of Development 
Economics 88(1): 103-119. 
Banful, A. B. 2011. Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically 
motivated transfers? Evidence from Ghana. Journal of Development Economics 96(2): 
380-90. 
Bergvall, D., Charbit, C., Kraan, D., and O. Merk. 2006. Intergovernmental transfers and 
decentralized spending. OECD Journal of Budgeting 5(4): 111-159. 
Berry, C., Curden, B., and W. Howell. 2010. The president and the distribution of federal 
spending. American Political Science Review 104(4): 783-799. 
Blöchliger, H., and C. Vammalle. 2009. Integovernmental grants in OECD countries: trends and 
some policy issues. Access online at http://english.oim.dk/media/212204/Bloechliger-
Vammalle.pdf. 
Blundell, R., and S. Bond. 1998. Initial conditions and moment restriction in dynamic panel data  
Models. Journal of Econometrics 87(1): 115-143.  
Bracco, E., Lockwood,B., Porcelli, F., and M. Redoano. 2015. Intergovernmental grants as 
signals and the alignment effect: theory and evidence. Journal of Public Economics 123(3): 
78-91. 
22 
 
Caldera Sánchez, A. 2013. Improving fiscal federal relations for a stronger Mexico. OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1078. Access online at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k42213gqpr3-en. 
Calvo, E., and M. V. Murillo. 2004. Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine  
electoral market. American Journal of Political Science 48(4): 742-757. 
Case, A. 2001. Election goals and income redistribution: recent evidence from Albania. European 
Economic Review 45(3): 405-423. 
Cole, S. 2009. Fixing market failures or fixing elections? Agricultural credit in India. American 
Economic Journal of Applied Economics 1(1): 219-250. 
Cox, G. W. and M. McCubbins. 1986. Electoral politics as a redistributive game. Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 48(2): 370-386.  
Dahlberg, M., and E. Johansson. 2002. On the vote–purchasing behaviour of incumbent 
governments. American Political Science Review 96(1): 27-40. 
Diaz-Cayeros, A. 2006. Federalism, fiscal authority and centralization in Latin America. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, A., F., and B. Maloni. 2012. Strategies of Vote Buying: Democracy, 
Clientelism and Poverty Relief in Mexico. Available at 
http://web.stanford.edu/~magaloni/dox/2012strategiesvotebuying.pdf (accessed February 12, 
2017). 
Dixit, A., and J. Londregon. 1996. The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive 
politics. The Journal of Politics 58(4): 1132-1155. 
Downs, A. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper Row. 
Epstein, R. A. 2010. Why we need term limits for congress: four in the senate, ten in the house. 
Tennessee Law Review 78(2): 849-857.  
Ferejohn, J., 1974. Pork Barrel Politics. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.  
Frey, B., and F. Schneider. 1978a. A politico-economic model of the United Kingdom. Economic 
Journal 88(350): 242-253. 
23 
 
Frey, B., and F. Schneider. 1978b. An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the US. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 60(2): 174-183. 
Golden, M., and B. Min. 2013. Distributive politics around the world. Annual Review of Political 
Science 16: 73-99. 
Gutiérrez, G., A. Lujambio, and D. Valadés. 2001. El proceso presupuestario y las relaciones 
entre los órganos del poder. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Mexico. 
Hanes, N., 2007. Temporary grant programmes in Sweden and central government behaviour. 
European Journal of Political Economy 23(4): 1160-1174. 
Hernández-Trillo, F., and B. Jarillo-Rabling. 2008. Is local beautiful? Fiscal decentralization in 
Mexico. World Development 36(9): 1547-1558. 
Hiskey, J. T. 2000. Does Democracy Matter? Electoral Competition and Local Development in 
Mexico. Paper presented to the Latin America Association, March 16-18, Available at 
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/Lasa2000/Hiskey.PDF (accessed 16 February 2017).  
Huang, B. and K. Chen. 2012. Are intergovernmental transfers in China equalizing? China 
Economic Review 23(3): 534-551. 
Jennes, G. and D. Persyn. 2015. The effect of political representation on the geographic 
distribution of income: evidence using Belgian data. European Journal of Political Economy 
37: 178-194. 
Johansson, E. 2003. Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from 
Swedish municipalities. Journal of Public Economics 23(5-6): 1160-1174. 
Kraemer, M. 1997. Intergovernmental transfers and political representation: empirical evidence 
from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief 
Economist, Working Paper 345. 
Langston, J. 2010 . Governors and “their” deputies: New legislative principals in Mexico. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 35(2): 235-258. 
Larcinese, V., Rizzo, L. and C. Testa. 2006. Allocating the U.S. Federal budget to the states: the 
impact of the president. Journal of Politics 68(2): 447-456. 
24 
 
Lindbeck, A. and J. Weibull. 1987. Balanced budget redistribution and the outcome of political 
competition. Public Choice 52(2): 273-97. 
Migueis, M. 2013. The effect of political alignment on transfers to Portuguese municipalities. 
Economics and Politics 25(1): 110-133. 
Moreno, C. 2005. Analysing the performance of local governments in Mexico: a political 
explanation of municipal budgetary choices. Centre for US-Mexican Studies University of 
California San Diego. 
Montero, A. 2001. After decentralization: patterns of intergovernmental conflict in Argentina, 
Brazil, Spain and Mexico. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 31(4): 43-64. 
Mueller, D. 2003. Public Choice III Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 
Nordhaus, W. 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42(2): 169-190. 
Oates, W. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Oates, W. 1999. An essay on fiscal federalism, Journal of Economic Literature 37(3): 1120-1149. 
Olmeda, J. 2009. Federalismo revitalizado, pluralismo político y acción legislativa. Las relaciones 
entre los gobernadores mexicanos y el Congreso de la Unión durante la última década. Efrén 
Arellano Trejo Jóvenes en México: cultura política y circunstancia actual 9, 103. 
Rodriguez, V. 1997. Decentralization in Mexico: from reforma municipal to solidaridad to nuevo 
federalism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Rogoff, K. 1990. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80(1): 21-36. 
Rogoff, K., Siebert, A. 1988. Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of Economic 
Studies 55(181): 1-16.  
Shi, M., and J. Svensson. 2006. Political budget cycles: do they differ across countries and why? 
Journal of Public Economics 90: 1367-89. 
Sobarzo Fimbres, H. E. 2009. Relaciones fiscales intergubernamentales en México: evolución 
reciente y perspectivas. Problemas del Desarrollo. Revista Latinoamericana de Economía 
40(156): 11-28. 
25 
 
Solé- Ollé, A. and P. Sorribas-Navarro. 2008. The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of 
intergovernmental transfers differences-in-differences estimates for Spain. Journal of Public 
Economics 92(72): 2301-2319. 
Sour, L., Ortega, I., and S. San Sebastián. 2004. Política presupuestaria durante la transición a la 
democracia en México: 1997-2003. Colección de Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE, No. 
142. 
Timmons, J. F., and D. Broid. 2013. The political economy of municipal transfers: evidence from 
Mexico. The Journal of Federalism 43(4): 551-579. 
Veiga, L. G. and M. M. Pinho. 2007. The political economy of intergovernmental grants: evidence 
from a maturing democracy. Public Choice 133(3-4): 457-477. 
Veiga, L. G. and F. J. Veiga. 2013. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel. Public choice 
155(3-4): 335-353. 
Wildavsky, A. 1988. The new politics of the budgetary process. Glenview Ill.: Scott Foreman & 
Co.  
26 
 
Appendix 
Table 1A. Formulae for the Allocation of Participaciones 
Type of fund 
 
Description 
1. General Fund of 
Contributions 
(Fondo General de 
Participaciones) 
Based on (i) nominal resources allocated in 20071 and (ii) a component 
determined by: GDP growth weighted by population (60%); the level of 
local tax revenue weighted by population (10%); and the increase in 
local tax revenues weighted by population (30%). 
2. Municipal 
Development Fund 
 
Based on (i) nominal amount allocated in 2007 and (ii) a component 
determined by: a percentage of the annual increase in the municipalities’ 
collection of revenue for property and water rights, weighted by 
population. (Each state must distribute 100% of this allocation to the 
municipalities with formulae established by local legislation.) 
3. Fiscalization 
Fund 
 
30% depends on a state’s GDP; 10% depends on goods seized from 
illegal entry into the country; 25% depends on the increase in the 
collection of revenue from ‘small taxpayers’; 25% depends on the 
increase in revenue from the intermediate regime tax; 5% depends on the 
collection of small taxpayers revenue; 5% depends on the level of 
revenue from the intermediate regime. (This fund should be transferred 
to the municipalities with formulae established by local legislation.) 
4. Participationes 
by the final sale of 
gasoline and diesel 
(IEPS) 
81.8% (9/11) based on revenue from fuel consumption in the each 
state’s territory.2 (States must transfer at least 20% of the transfers to the 
municipalities and 70% of the resource must be shared with reference to 
municipalities’ population.) 
5. Compensation 
fund 
 
The distribution formula depends inversely on GDP (excluding oil 
production and mining). Only 10% is distributed to the top 10 states with 
the highest GDP. 18.2% (2/11) is the remaining proceed from a final tax 
on the sale of gasoline and diesel in each state. (States must transfer at 
least 20% to municipalities. 70% of these resources must be shared with 
the population.) 
6. Oil Extraction 
Fund 
 
75% depends on the gross value added from mining in each state, 
according to the classification of oil and gas defined in the last economic 
census, conducted by the INEGI. 25% is based on the value of natural 
gas production associated with the state (also according to the INEGI 
latest data). (States must transfer at least 20% of this fund to their 
municipalities.) 
7. Participationes 
from assignable 
taxes (IEPS, ISAN 
and Possession) 
The IEPS is allocated to states in proportion to their IEPS national tax 
revenue. The ISAN is 100% of the proceeds from the state, as well as the 
car and property tax. (States must transfer at least 20% to 
municipalities.) 
8. Special 
participations for 
border and coastal 
towns 
The allocation is based on improvements in the collection of the 
previous two years in water and property taxes, weighted with the 
coefficient of the immediately preceding year. (These resources are 
delivered directly to municipalities without the intervention of the state 
governments.) 
1 Before 2008: 45.17% of the transfers were allocated proportionally to the population; 45.17% according to the 
collection of three federal taxes levied by the states (road tax, special taxes on alcohol beverages and tobacco and new 
cars tax); and 9.66% on a compensation basis, in inverse proportion to the number of people in each state. 
2 Provided there is a cooperation agreement concluded with the Federation (in which states bind themselves to fulfil 
certain obligations). 
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Table 2A. Formulae for the Allocation of Aportaciones 
Type of fund 
 
Description 
1. Educational Payroll 
and Operating 
Expenses (FAEB)1 
The formula is based on the number of students enrolled in the public education 
system in each state: an index of education quality elaborated by the Ministry of 
Education and the state’s own expenditure on education. 
2. Health Services 
Contribution Fund 
(FASSA) 
 
The formula depends on each state’s: inventory of medical infrastructure; number of 
staff; operating expenses; investment and other resources specifically allocated by the 
Budget of Expenditures of the Federation (to promote equity in the health services). 
The formula for this last component depends on the deviation of the health budget 
deficit of each state compared to the total health budget deficit of all states "below the 
minimum accepted" by all states’ deficit. The category "minimum accepted" is based 
on a balance between (i) the population of each state; (ii) the level of poverty and (iii) 
the level of mortality. Additional resources may be approved by the Federal Budget. 
(The Ministry of Health announces the formulae in the Official Diary.) 
3. Contribution Fund 
for Social 
Infrastructure (FAIS) 
 
Depends on: income per capita; average education of the household; availability of 
living space; drainage; electricity and fuel for cooking (all measured and weighted at 
the household level). (The formulae for allocations to municipalities depends on: the 
employed population of the municipality earning less than two minimum wages; the 
municipal population aged 15 and over who cannot read and write; the local 
population living in private homes without availability of a drain connected to a 
septic tank, or street, and the local population living in private homes without 
electricity available. (All of these variables are measured relative to the state's 
population in the same conditions.) Before 2013, Distrito Federal was excluded from 
FAIS. 
4. Contribution Fund 
for Strengthening 
Municipalities and the 
territorial 
demarcations of 
Distrito Federal 
(FORTRAMUNDF). 
Allocations (to municipalities and demarcations of Distrito Federal) are in proportion 
to the number of inhabitants of each state, according to the latest statistical 
information issued by INEGI. (State’s and Distrito Federal governments should 
publish the formulae used to determine the amounts that correspond to each 
municipality, or territory, in their Official Diary before January 31 of each year.) 
 
5. Multiple 
Contributions Fund 
(FAM ) 
The Ministries of Health and Education announce the formulae in the Official Diary 
no later than 31 January of each year.  
6. Contribution Fund 
for Technological 
Education and 
Education of Adults 
(FAETA ) 
The formulae considers the specific priorities and compensatory strategies for the 
abatement of the lag in literacy, basic education and job training. Formulae are 
published by the Ministry of Education no later than January 31 each year in the 
Official Diary.  
7.Contribution Fund 
for Public Security of 
the States and Distrito 
Federal 
 
The formulae includes: the population of the states and Distrito Federal; the rate of 
prison occupancy; the implementation of crime prevention programmes; the 
resources allocated to support actions on public security developed by the 
municipalities, and the progress in implementing the National Program of Public 
Security on professionalism, equipment, technological modernization and 
infrastructure. 
8. Contribution Fund 
for the Strengthening 
of Federal Entities 
(FAFEF before 
PAFEF)  
The allocation is based on past contributions from 2007 and a weighted inverse factor 
(of GDP per capita and population) for each state. 
 
 Notes: 1 In 2013 this was renamed the Educational Payroll and Operating Expenses.  
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Figure 1 Transfers and Own Income Shares of States’ Total Revenue 
 
Source: Based on data from Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales (INEGI). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Relationship between federal revenue per capita and total transfers per capita 
 
Notes: Data on federal revenues per capita comes from the OECD National Accounts, while data on transfers per capita is 
available through Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales. The transfers per capita data represented 
in the chart are average values across the 31 states.  
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Table 1: Unconditional and Conditional Transfers (in millions of 2001 pesos) 
 
Transfers 2001 2002 2003 
Unconditional (Participaciones)       
Executive Budget Proposal       190,442        184,325        209,409  
Approved by Lower Chamber       192,036        195,778        210,250  
Additional Resources          1,594          11,453              841  
% of the Initial Budget            0.83             5.85             0.40  
    
Conditional (Aportaciones)       
Executive Budget Proposal       209,069        188,552        219,846  
Approved by Lower Chamber       204,149        197,851        220,000  
Additional Resources        -4,920           9,299              154  
% of the Initial Budget            2.41             4.70             0.07  
Source: Calculations based on the data compiled by Sour et al. (2004)   
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Table 2: Distribution of transfers across the Mexican states 
State 
 
Transfers per capita 
Mexican Pesos 
 
Aguascalientes 9,685 
Baja California 7,728 
Baja California Sur 11,650 
Campeche 14,277 
Coahuila 8,066 
Colima 11,980 
Chiapas 9,630 
Chihuahua 8,170 
Durango 10,051 
Guanajuato 6,780 
Guerrero 9,678 
Hidalgo 8,805 
Jalisco 7,448 
Estado de Mexico 7,506 
Michoacan 8,136 
Morelos 8,517 
Nayarit 11,123 
Nuevo Leon 8,569 
Oaxaca 10,239 
Puebla 7,632 
Queretaro 8,873 
Quintana Roo 10,030 
San Luis Potosi 8,870 
Sinaloa 9,196 
Sonora 10,005 
Tabasco 14,628 
Tamaulipas 8,998 
Tlaxcala 9,556 
Veracruz 8,095 
Yucatan 8,851 
Zacatecas 11,279 
  
All 31 States 
 
 
Mean 9,432 
Standard Deviation 2,495 
Source: Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales. Average values 
from 2004 to 2012. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
Label Variable Mean 
Standard deviation 
Overall Between Within 
Tr 
Total transfers per capita        9,122         2,451         2,225         1,096  
Unconditional transfers per capita        3,532         1,272         1,215            428  
Conditional transfers per capita        5,608         1,495         1,293            781  
Y GDP per capita    121,419      160,286     159,374       32,116  
Un Unemployment rate        0.037         0.017         0.011         0.014  
Dr Dependency ratio      58.655         6.206         5.456         3.101  
Rev 
Total federal tax revenue per capita      15,054         1,970              -       1,970 
Own revenue per capita           739            389            344            191  
Elec Federal election dummy           0.4             0.5              -             0.50  
margin Lower chamber vote margin           0.0             0.1           0.07           0.13  
Vote Lower chamber vote share           0.3             0.1           0.07           0.08  
Source: Estadisticas de las Finanzas Publicas Estatales y Municipales, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI) and INEGI 
Economic Information Database. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Mexican transfers incorporating the vote margin between the 
controlling party and the nearest rival 
 
 
Control Variables Total 
Transfers 
Unconditional 
transfers 
Conditional 
transfers 
Lagged log transfers per capita (trit-1) 0.684*** 0.720*** 0.474*** 
 (0.120) (0.050) (0.122) 
Lagged log GDP per capita (yit-1) 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.227**  
(0.042) (0.041) (0.109) 
Lagged unemployment rate (unit-1) -0.364 -0.735 -1.068  
(0.878) (0.532) (1.135) 
Lagged dependency ratio (drit-1) 0.649* 0.087 1.665***  
(0.340) (0.233) (0.628) 
Lag of own to total revenue (revit-1) 0.452 -0.019 0.166  
(0.436) (0.421) (0.607) 
Federal election dummy (elect) 0.092*** 0.101*** 0.142***  
(0.026) (0.015) (0.047) 
Lagged lower chamber vote margin (marginit-1) -0.105*** -0.033 -0.110**  
(0.033) (0.038) (0.050) 
constant -3.967** -1.718** -9.156*** 
 (1.641) (0.861) (2.785) 
       
No. of observations (N×T) 279 279 279 
T 9 9 9 
No. of instruments  37 37 37 
Pseudo R2 0.83 0.94 0.76 
Joint significance for time effects:
2
7χ  136.72 472.87 103.01 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2nd order serial correlation -0.110 -0.205 0.503 
p-value [0.913] [0.837] [0.615] 
Hansen 19.011 20.779 18.704 
p-value [0.645] [0.534] [0.664] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 10.56 9.29 4.83 
p-value [0.648] [0.751] [0.664] 
Notes: Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The Hansen test reports that under the null the over-identified restrictions are valid. The 
Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order serial correlation is reported under the null of no autocorrelation. For the difference-in-Hansen test 
the null hypothesis suggest that the instrument subset for the level equation are orthogonal to the error (i.e. the instrument set is 
uncorrelated with the error term). 
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Table 5:  Determinants of Mexican transfers incorporating vote share of the 
controlling party of the lower chamber 
 
Control Variables Total 
Transfers 
Unconditional 
transfers 
Conditional 
transfers 
Lagged log transfers per capita (trit-1) 0.615*** 0.712*** 0.453*** 
 (0.102) (0.050) (0.134) 
Lagged log GDP per capita (yit-1) 0.136*** 0.119** 0.230**  
(0.049) (0.048) (0.105) 
Lagged unemployment rate (unit-1) -0.397 -0.839* -1.072  
(0.853) (0.509) (1.148) 
Lagged dependency ratio (drit-1) 0.752** -0.039 1.689***  
(0.347) (0.226) (0.633) 
Lag of own to total revenue (revit-1) 0.499 0.045 0.190  
(0.443) (0.443) (0.608) 
Federal election dummy (elect) 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.142***  
(0.025) (0.015) (0.048) 
Lagged lower chamber vote share (voteit-1) -0.195*** -0.207** -0.132  
(0.069) (0.097) (0.102) 
Constant -4.627*** -1.170 -9.327*** 
 (1.606) (0.873) (2.810) 
       
No. of observations (N×T) 279 279 279 
T 9 9 9 
No. of instruments 37 37 37 
Pseudo R2 0.80 0.94 0.76 
Joint significance for time effects:
2
7χ  148.25 271.78 141.54 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2nd order serial correlation 0.385 -0.066 0.294 
p-value [0.700] [0.947] [0.769] 
Hansen test 18.676 23.805 18.499 
p-value [0.665] [0.358] [0.676] 
Difference in Hansen test 9.71 5.95 7.60 
p-value [0.717] [0.948] [0.868] 
Notes: see table 4 
 
